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I. INTRODUCTION
"The bankruptcy court is a court of equity." The statement is ubiquitous.
Parties routinely open their courtroom arguments with the observation.'
Published bankruptcy decisions ofboth trial and appellate courts are salted with
the reference,2 and scholars regularly debate the scope of the bankruptcy
* Marcia Krieger was appointed as a United States Bankruptcy Judge in 1994. She
serves in the District of Colorado.
I. In the author's experience, the frequency of reference to the bankruptcy court as
a court of equity is second only to introductions, "May it please the Court" or "Good morning
(afternoon), Your Honor."
2. At the drafting of this Article, a search of WestLaw bankruptcy-related opinions
revealed that nearly 5,000 described the bankruptcy court as a "court of equity."
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court's equitable powers and jurisdiction.3 Assumed to be a truism, the
statement is never questioned. Used as a mantra, it is invoked to create a
desired effect. The question is, what does it mean?
Nearly two hundred years have passed since the enactment of the first
federal bankruptcy laws in this country. Congress is currently considering
changes to bankruptcy law to meet the needs of the twenty-first century.
Perhaps now is an appropriate time to consider why the bankruptcy court is so
frequently characterized as a court of equity and to what degree it can serve as
one. To answer these questions it is helpful to explore the historical origins of
the Anglo-American bankruptcy system, the degree to which equitable
attributes have been integrated into it, and the context of common references
to the bankruptcy court as a court of equity. Interestingly, this endeavor leads
to several conclusions that are inconsistent with common assumptions.
1. History does not support the common characterization of the
bankruptcy court as a court of equity. American bankruptcy law and
procedure did not develop out of bankruptcy proceedings before
English chancery courts. Anglo-American bankruptcy law has always
been a creature of statute, separate and distinct from traditional equity
jurisprudence.
2. Bankruptcy laws, by their nature, embody a compromise between
fundamental, competing social and economic objectives. The nature
of the compromise varies from time to time as public values and
economic conditions dictate. Bankruptcy law is implemented by using
both legal and equitable procedures.
3. The function of bankruptcy courts is to implement the social policy set
forth in bankruptcy law. Although the bankruptcy process in some
respects may resemble particular equitable remedies, the bankruptcy
court is no more a court of equity than any other court applying
statutory law or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Bankruptcy
courts exercise power granted by statute and preside in civil actions
that may include both legal and equitable claims.
4. Labeling the bankruptcy court as a court of equity is a result ofjudicial
rather than legislative action. The designation has no universal
meaning and is, therefore, used for a variety of purposes. Without a
generally accepted meaning, the designation confuses more frequently
than it clarifies the role of the bankruptcy court and leads to
disappointed expectations.
3. See, e.g., Manuel D. Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29
S. TEx. L. REv. 487 (1988); G. Ray Warner, Katchen Up in Bankruptcy: The New Jury Trial
Right, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1989); Robert H. George, Note, Bankruptcyfor Nonbankruptcy
Purposes: Are There Any Limits?, 6 Rav. LITIG. 95 (1987); Brian Leepson, Comment, A Case
for the Use ofa Broad Court Equity Power to Facilitate Chapter 11 Reorganization, 12 BANKR.
DEv. J. 775 (1996).
[Vol. 50:275
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II. THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
The English chancery court proceeding is commonly accepted as the
ancestor of American bankruptcy law and procedure. This assumption is
incorrect. Statutes created bankruptcy remedies and insolvency rights in
England. Bankruptcy proceedings were different than equity proceedings.4
4. By necessity, this Article summarizes only the differences between English
common law and equity traditions, and English bankruptcy and insolvency laws. The author has
relied upon and encourages the reader to refer to more comprehensive analyses of common law
and equity traditions in England and historical English bankruptcy and insolvency laws. See
generally Findley v. Falise (In re JointE. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig.), 878 F. Supp. 473, 515-18
(E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995)(tracing the development of equity jurisdiction and equity trusts in
England); THOMAS COOPER, THE BANKRUPT LAW OF AMERICA, COMPARED WITH THE BANKRUPT
LAW OF ENGLAND ix-x (1801)(providing an overview of bankruptcy concepts as they were
understood in nineteenth-century England); S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
COMMON LAW 1-87 (1969)(discussing the development of the common law and equity
principles); THEODOREF.T. PLUCKNETT, ACONCISEHIsToRYOFTHECMMONLAW 1-76,139-56
(5th ed. Little, Brown & Co. 1956) (1929)(surveying the development of English legal history
and the origins of the central courts); I JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 1-34 (1881)(providing a history of the inception and development of English
equity courts); I HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES xiii (James M. Henderson ed., 5th ed. Law. Co-op. Publ. Co. 1950)(summarizing the
development of English law and foundation for American bankruptcy law); EDWARD STANLEY
ROSCOE, THE GROWTH OFENGLISHLAW 169-82 (191 l)(tracing the history ofEnglish bankruptcy
legislation); Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale,
103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1656-73 (1994)(providing the historical background of English legal and
political philosophy from the twelfth to seventeenth centuries); Vem Countryman, A History of
American BankruptcyLaw, 81 COM. L.J. 226,226-32 (1976) (surveying the influence of English
bankruptcy law on bankruptcy law in the United States); Andrew J. Duncan, From
Dismemberment to Discharge: The Origins ofModern American BankruptcyLaw, 100 COM. L.J.
191, 200, 216-20 (1995)(analyzing only English bankruptcy acts and their influence on the
formation of American bankruptcy law); Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United
States, 96 COM. L.J. 160, 163-63 (1991)(providing a brief introduction to English bankruptcy
law); W.J. Jones, The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in the
Early Modern Period, 69 TRANSACTIONSOFTHEAM. PHIL. SOC'Y pt. 3 (1979)(tracing the history
of English bankruptcy law from Tudor and early Stuart society); Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the
Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 215-25 (1957)(explaining the
history of the Bankruptcy Clause in the United States Constitution as it developed at the
Constitutional Convention); James Monroe Olmstead, Bankruptcy A Commercial Regulation,
15 HARv. L. REV. 829passim (1901-02)(recounting the legislative history and key cases in early
American bankruptcy law); Thomas E. Plank, The ConstitutionalLimits ofBankruptcy, 63 TENN.
L. REV. 487,500-17 (1996)(discussing the development of bankruptcy law in England); Edward
J. Ross, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits by Trustees in Bankruptcy, 20 IOWA L. REV. 565 passim
(I 934-35)(tracing the history ofjurisdictional problems arising from inconsistencies within the
Bankruptcy Act); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914-21 (1987)(reviewing
basic characteristics and evolution ofthe English courts of law and equity); Charles Jordan Tabb,
The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 326-44
(1991)(examining the development of discharge in English law up to the time of the writing of
the United States Constitution); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History ofthe Bankruptcy Laws in the
United States, 3 AM.BANKR. INST. L.REv. 5,6-12 (1995) [hereinafter Tabb, History](discussing
English antecedents to American bankruptcy law); Warner, supra note 3, at 6 (referring to "the
1999]
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A. Distinctions Between English Actions at Law and in Equity
Modem concepts of equity arise from England's historical distinction
between "common law" or "law" courts,5 and "chancery" or "equity" courts.6
Although complementary, English law and equity courts had different and
distinct procedural systems, jurisprudential foundations, and purposes. "The
law courts had three identifying characteristics: the writ .... the jury, and
single issue pleading."7 These characteristics, in combination, isolated issues
and focused disputes for the purpose of predictable application of the law. In
contrast, courts of equity were designed to be flexible and to provide
comprehensive determinations which could not be obtained through the
common law courts.
8
Actions at law originated by filing a grievance with the King's Chancellor.9
The chancellor sold writs authorizing a law court to hear the case and
instructing a sheriffto secure the defendant's presence.'" The nature of the writ
determined the subject matter, personal jurisdiction, burden of proof, and
methods of execution on any judgment obtained. Parties were entitled to trial
by a jury of their peers and a remedy in the form of a money judgment.
The strength of the common law system was its organized body of case law
and consequent predictability. However, it was perceived as rigid and rarified.
Due to the multitude of procedural rules, parties could lose on technicalities.
Lawyers often engaged in legal "fictions" in order to pigeon-hole claims into
recognized forms of action.
Equity practice developed in response to the rigidity and technicality of the
boundaries of law and equity" in England); Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the
Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 13-39
(1 986)(reviewing the history of English bankruptcy and preference law); Mark Bradshaw, Note,
The Role of Politics and Economics in Early American Bankruptcy Law, 18 WHITrIER L. REV.
739, 740-47 (1996)(explaining the state of English bankruptcy law at the time of the American
constitutional convention).
5. Actually, there were a variety of law courts, including King's Bench, Exchequer,
and Common Pleas. See MILSOM, supra note 4, at 26-46, 53-54; PLUCKNETr, supra note 4, at
146-50.
6. Black's Law Dictionary has essentially the same definition for "court of chancery"
and "court of equity." A court of chancery administers "equity and proceeding according to the
forms and principles of equity." BLACK'SLAWDICrIONARY 356 (6th ed. 1990). A court of equity
"administers justice and decides controversies in accordance with the rules, principles, and
precedents of equity, and which follows the forms and procedure of chancery." Id. Both
definitions note that equity courts have been abolished in all states that have adopted rules of
civil procedure-states in which law and equity actions have been merged procedurally into a
single form of civil action. Id.
7. Subrin, supra note 4, at 914.
8. See MILSOM, supra note 4, at 74-87.
9. Often referred to as the chancellor or Lord Chancellor.
10. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 915.
11. 1d. at917.
278 - [Vol. 50:275
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writ-dominated common law system.'2 As with common law disputes,
equitable matters began with filing a grievance with the chancellor. When the
situation was unusual or no common law remedy was available, grievants
submitted a "bill in equity" to persuade the chancellor to relieve them from
alleged injustices which would result from rigorous application of the common
law. 3 Chancery jurisdiction covered fraud, mistake, fiduciary relationships,
trusts, and other areas excluded by common law writs.
Initially the chancellor was a bishop, and the equity court became known
as the Court of Conscience. This reference had dual importance. First, unlike
in common law courts, the chancellor could compel the defendant to testify and
could order specific relief to undo past injuries or to regulate the defendant's
future conduct.' 4 Second, the chancellor was expected to consider all of the
circumstances and interests of the affected parties. The chancellor had the
ability to join all interested parties in a single action and could consider larger
moral issues and questions of fairness. In the beginning, chancellors based their
decisions on "the law of God or [on] conscience."'" Later, their rulings were
based upon concepts of "natural justice or the law of nature."' 6 The equity
procedure was more flexible, discretionary, and individualized than the
common law process. The chancellor was free to include more parties and
issues, to consider and impose a variety of remedies, was less bound by
precedent, and was permitted to determine both questions of fact and law.'7
However, equity was available only when no adequate remedy at law existed.
Thus, it grew interstitially to fill the gaps in the common law.
Equity courts were not without critics. The common law courts in the
seventeenth century were viewed as the protectors of the rights of citizens
because matters were tried to ajury. In contrast, equity courts such as the Court
of the Star Chamber and Court of Chancery were seen as dominated and
controlled by the crown.' 8 Equity courts also developed case precedent that
began to burden the process.
12. See id. at 915-18; MILSOM, supra note 4, at 74-83; POMEROY, supra note 4, § 21.
13. Subrin, supra note 4, at 918.
14. These powers gave rise to the contemporary equitable remedies that compel
particular behavior ofparties. Some of these remedies are injunctions, accountings, recission of
contracts, reformation of instruments, termination of rights or interests, and restrictions on use
of property.
15. HENRYL.MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOKOFTHEPRINCIPLESOFEQUITY 6 (2d ed. 1948).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 20-32.
18. In Findley v. Falise (In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig.), 878 F. Supp. 473
(E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court recited the history of the conflict between Lord Coke, Chief
Justice of the leading common law court, and the Lord Chancellor. A common law court had
ruled against a defendant even though an important witness was prevented from testifying by
being induced to become drunk. On appeal, theplaintiff violated the Lord Chancellor's order and
was imprisoned for contempt. Lord Coke threatened to prosecute the Lord Chancellor but the
King intervened, supporting the Lord Chancellor, even to the extent of interfering with the
common law court's ability to secure justice. See id. at 515-17.
1999]
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In the English colonies in America, colonists generally preferred jury trials
to resolve civil disputes. 9 The concept of equity as an alternative to the
common law was adopted, but its application was not always through a
chancellor or equity court.20 One commentator observes:
When the English colonists came to this country, they
brought with them the laws of England, including the system
of equity which had been developed in England by the
chancellors. In many of the colonies, the Puritan opposition
to the king led, as it did in England, to an opposition to the
chancellor, as a royal appointee, and in most of them there
was a struggle between the popular legislatures and the royal,
or proprietary, governors, for the control of the administration
of equity. Where the governors prevailed, they exercised the
power themselves, or appointed chancellors to do so. Where
the legislature prevailed, the administration of the system was
vested in local courts, often the same courts as were already
exercising jurisdiction in common law cases.2'
When the federal government was formed, federal courts were given
jurisdiction in both law and equity actions in accordance with the
Constitution.' Equity and legal jurisdiction were separate; a federal court could
sit either in equity or as a court of law depending on the nature of the claim.
Equity trials were presnted to the court; at law, trials were presented to ajury.
The first judiciary act and its successors provided that equity matters were
determined by the precedent of the English Chancery court, except as modified
by equity rules promulgated from time to time by the United States Supreme
Court.u However, in common law actions, federal courts applied state common
law. Due to the distinction between equity and legal actions and the difference
in the precedent applied, federal courts had little occasion to use equity to fill
the gaps in the common law.
Debate about the relative merits of law and equity jurisprudence abounded
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.24 In the federal system the
debate ended in 1938 with adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
through which equitable and legal claims were merged into a single civil
action, subject to a single set of procedural rules.' Adoption of similar rules of
civil procedure by many states resulted in the merger of equity and law actions
19. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 927-29.
20. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 15, at 12.
21. Id. (footnote omitted).
22. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
23. See Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 205 (1893).
24. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 931-82.
25. See FED. R. Civ. P. 86.
[Vol. 50: 275
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before state courts and elimination of chancery or equity courts.26
This merger did not subordinate equity to law. Some suggest that civil
procedure is now largely an equitable process with substantial flexibility,
simplified pleading, permissive joinder of parties and issues into a single
action, broad-scope discovery, the availability of class actions, and a panoply
of remedies that can be considered. Other commentators note that broadening
public access to the courts, creating new remedies, and enactment of new
federal laws to address social ills served equitable objectives during the last
thirty years.28
Both federal district courts and bankruptcy courts apply the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Therefore, in civil matters before the district court and
adversary proceedings before the bankruptcy court, the distinction between law
and equity is now limited to the type of remedy imposed and the parties' right
to a jury trial. Common law claims give rise to a right to jury trial and result in
money judgments. Equitable claims lead to equitable remedies such as
injunctions, accountings, interpleader, rescission and reformation of contracts,
clearing of title to property, imposition of constructive or resulting trusts, or
disposition of proceeds of funds to class claimants. Statutes can give rise to
both equitable remedies and legal rights.
29
B. The Origin ofAmerican Bankruptcy Law and Process
Although bankruptcy rights and remedies have existed since early times,"
26. Abolition of formal distinctions between actions at law and actions in equity
occurred by code or practice acts
in the following states in the years indicated:
Arizona, 1864; California, 1850; Colorado, 1877;
Connecticut, 1879; Illinois, 1933; Indiana, 1852;
Idaho, 1864; Kansas, 1859; Minnesota, 1851;
Missouri, 1849; Montana, 1865; Nebraska, 1855;
Nevada, 1860; New Mexico, 1897; New York, 1848;
North Carolina, 1868; North Dakota, 1862; Ohio,
1853; Oklahoma, 1890; South Carolina, 1870; South
Dakota, 1862; Utah, 1870; Washington, 1854;
Wisconsin, 1856; and Wyoming, 1869.
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 15, at 13-14 n.46.
27. Subrin, supra note 4, at 923-24.
28. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass
Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 269, 270-72 (1991).
29. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) defines the scope of the bankruptcy court's
authority to enter final judgments as "core proceedings." Subject to the courts' "equitable
jurisdiction," these matters pertain to certain aspects of bankruptcy estate administration and are
tried to the bankruptcy court. However, if a core proceeding requires ajury, 28 U.S.C. § 157(e)
authorizes the bankruptcy judge to conduct a jury trial if designated by the district court and
agreed to by the parties. Presumably, in this capacity the bankruptcy court sits as a court of law.
30. Historians trace early forms of bankruptcy to ancient societies. Early Roman law
authorized creditors to liquidate a debtor's assets, "cut up his body and divide the pieces or leave
him alive and sell him into slavery." JAMES WM. MOORE & WALTER RAY PHILLIPs, DEBTORS'
1999]
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the bankruptcy and insolvency laws of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
England greatly influenced American bankruptcy law. English laws were not
directly transplanted to American shores; instead American social, economic,
and philosophical influences modified English tradition to create American
bankruptcy law.
1. English Bankruptcy Laws
In England bankruptcy law was a creature of statute. Early bankruptcy
laws were quasi-criminal in nature, invoked by creditors to preserve and
distribute a bankrupt's assets upon the commission of an act of bankruptcy.
Scholars generally agree that the first English bankruptcy statute was enacted
in 1542.3' The 1542 Henry VIII statute was entitled "An act against such
persons as do make bankrupts."32 It provided creditors with a remedy against
fraudulent and absconding merchants, authorizing imprisonment if necessary.33
Bankruptcy under this act-and for almost three centuries following-was
exclusively involuntary and limited to merchants.34 As in the common law and
equity systems, creditors complained to the chancellor. The statute granted
jurisdiction to the "lord chancellor of England, or keeper of the great seal, the
lord treasurer, the lord president, lord privy seal, and other of the King's most
honourable privy council, the chiefjustices of either bench ... or three of them
at the least."35 Upon notice, a debtor's assets were seized, appraised, and sold
with the proceeds distributed pro rata to all creditors proving just claims.36
Twenty-eight years later, when the number of defaulting debtors was on
the rise, England enacted a more comprehensive bankruptcy law entitled "An
act touching orders for bankrupts."37 The 1570 Elizabeth statute amplified the
earlier law, expressly limiting its provisions to "traders," defined as "any
merchant or other person, using or exercising the trade ofmerchandize by way
of bargaining, exchange, rechange, bartry, chevisance, or otherwise, in gross
or by retail... or seeking his or her trade of living by buying and selling."" As
with its predecessor, relief under the later act was involuntary, and no discharge
was granted.39
The 1570 Elizabeth statute is probably most important for its procedure.
According to one historian, this statute "discerned the beginning of the whole
AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 1-1 (4th ed. 1975); Countryman, supra note 4, at 226-27.
31. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-43) (Eng.).
32. Id.
33. See Tabb, History, supra note 4, at 8.
34. The act only protected traders. Id. at 9. "Traders" was defined in the 1570
Elizabeth Statute. See 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 1 (1570) (Eng.).
35. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4, § 1 (1542-43) (Eng.).
36. Id.
37. 13 Eliz., ch. 7 (1570) (Eng.).
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modem [English] machinery of official assignees, trustees, commissioners,
judges, and the rest of the army of officials by whom the State has from time
to time endeavoured to protect creditors."4 Creditors' grievances were
submitted to the chancellor, who appointed a commission of "such wise and
honest discreet persons as to him shall seem good."41 The commission took
charge of the debtor and his assets and distributed the debtor's property ratably
among his creditors. 2 Commissioners were empowered to examine the debtor
as well as anyone alleged to be an accomplice to a fraudulent conveyance. 3 If
the transfer was found to be fraudulent, the commission could levy a fine equal
to twice the value of the assets fraudulently conveyed.' If the debtor hid, the
commissioners could order the debtor to appear and could imprison or fine
anyone who helped the debtor escape. 5 The debtor could appeal the
commission's determination to the chancellor."
England again enacted bankruptcy legislation favoring creditors in 1604,47
1623,48 and 1662.49 New remedies were employed to reach more assets and
harsher penalties were imposed against non-compliant bankrupts. All of the
acts compelled bankrupts to be examined by the commissioners. Under the
1623 James statute, a debtor who perjured himself at his examination could be
pilloried for two hours, then have his ear cut off."0 This punishment was also
applicable to bankrupts convicted of making a fraudulent conveyance or failing
to explain why they became bankrupt.5'
In 1705 Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne,52 which first addressed
debt discharge. As with prior statutes, bankruptcy remained an involuntary
procedure available only to creditors of merchants. Discharge was limited to
bankrupts who fully complied with the spirit and the letter of the law.
53
Discharge was discretionary, requiring that a majority of the commissioners,
with the approval of creditors, certify that the bankrupt had "conformed" to the
law,54 which required full disclosure of financial affairs and delivery of all
40. RoscoE, supra note 4, at 172.
41. 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 2 (1570) (Eng.).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 8. Also, for an extensive review of this procedure, see Duncan, supra note
4, at 196.
45. 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 9 (1570) (Eng.).
46. Id. This is why many old English bankruptcy decisions are ascribed to the
chancellor.
47. See 1 Jam., ch. 15 (1604) (Eng.).
48. See 21 Jam., ch. 19 (1623) (Eng.).
49. See 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 24 (1662) (Eng.).
50. 21 Jam., ch. 19, § 7 (1623) (Eng.); see Duncan, supra note 4, at 197.
51. Tabb, Historical, supra note 4, at 331 n.40, 332 n.41.
52. 4 Anne, ch. 17 (1705) (Eng.).
53. Id. § 7.
54. Id. § 19.
1999]
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assets to the commissioners."5 Upon issuance of a "certificate of conformity,"
the bankrupt became eligible to receive a monetary allowance from the estate. 6
The chancellor had discretion to adjust the size of the allowance to ensure
creditors received a sufficient dividend. 7 If discharge and allowance were
carrots inducing a bankrupt's compliance, the stick to punish noncompliance
of fraudulent debtors was that they "shall suffer as a felon without benefit of
clergy," an eighteenth century euphemism for the death penalty."
In 1732 Parliament comprehensively codified and revised English
bankruptcy law.59 The 1732 statute was in effect for almost a century until
being repealed in 1824.60 The 1732 George statute varied little from its
predecessor. The bankruptcy process continued to be supervised by a
commission that had the power to investigate the affairs of the debtor, collect
and sell assets, distribute the proceeds to creditors, issue a certificate of
conformity, and award an allowance to a compliant debtor. The statute
restricted issuance of the certificate of conformity after the first bankruptcy
case; in successive cases, certificates were available only if the debtor paid a
seventy-five percent dividend to creditors. 6' If debtors refused to answer, lied,
or gave unsatisfactory answers, the commission could commit them to jail
without bail or impose the death penalty. For fraudulent conveyances, the
commission could impose punishment in the pillory or by mutilation. 2
2. English Insolvency Laws
Many debtors were not subject to bankruptcy laws, either because they
were not merchants or because they had committed no specified act of
bankruptcy. However, these debtors remained subject to individual debt
collection through the common law courts.
In eighteenth century England, the creditor's [non-
bankruptcy] remedies were limited to the writ offierifacias
which authorized the sheriff to seize the goods of the
debtor ... to pay the debt; the writ of levarifacias enabling
the sheriff to seize the personal property of the debtor and the
rents from the debtor's real property to satisfy the debt; the
writ of elegit allowing delivery of the goods . . . at an
appraised value in satisfaction of the debt ... ; or the writ of
55. Id. § 7; Tabb, Historical, supra note 4, at 333-35.
56. 4 Anne, ch. 17, §§ 7-8 (1705) (Eng.).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 18. From all records it appears that the death penalty was rarely imposed.
59. 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30 (1732) (Eng.).
60. 5 Geo. 4, ch. 98, § 1 (1824) (Eng.).
61. 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 9 (1732) (Eng.).
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capias ad satisfaciendum by which the debtor was
imprisoned until the debt was paid.63
Using the mesne process, a creditor appeared before a designated court official
and swore that the debt was overdue or that the debtor intended to run, hide, or
conceal property. The court issued a writ directing the sheriff to seize the
debtor. After twenty-four hours in jail the debtor could pay the debt, post bail,
or remain in detention until trial. The creditor was required by the end of the
following legal term to state a cause of action so the case could be tried. The
debtor appeared in court and pled in response. The judge summarized the case
and the jury decided liability. Debtors found liable were subject to the various
writs for collection."
English insolvency acts allowed certain debtors owing debts in specified
amounts to be released from prison by assigning all of their real and personal
property for liquidation and satisfaction of the debt.65 In essence, this allowed
debtors to elect to satisfy the debt rather than to be imprisoned, but elections to
assign property did not discharge any unpaid portion of the debt. The
insolvency acts applied to non-merchants as well as to merchants and were
initiated by a debtor's petition. However, the insolvency acts did not protect all
debtors. Some acts limited relief to those who were willing to go into military
or naval service. Other acts limited relief to those owing debts of particular
amounts.
The bankruptcy and insolvency acts first converged in the 1758 George II
statute.66 Insolvency provisions benefitted debtors imprisoned for sums of less
than 100 Pounds Sterling.67
[A] creditor could compel a debtor who did not seek release
from debtor's prison to give an account of his or her property
and to assign the property for the benefit of the petitioning
creditor and other consenting creditors. If the debtor refused,
he would be transported to a colony in America for
indentured service for seven years.68
63. Plank, supra note 4, at 515-16 (footnotes omitted).
64. See Duncan, supra note 4, at 212-14.
65. See, e.g., 2 & 3 Anne, ch. 16 (1703) (Eng.); 6 Geo. 1, ch. 22 (1719) (Eng.); 11
Geo. 1, ch. 21 (1724) (Eng.); 2 Geo. 2, ch. 20 (1729) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 2, ch. 31 (1748) (Eng.); 28
Geo. 2, ch. 13 (1755) (Eng.); 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26 (1768) (Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23 (1772) (Eng.); 14
Geo. 3, ch. 77 (1774) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38 (1776) (Eng.); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52 (1778) (Eng.);
21 Geo. 3, ch. 63 (1781) (Eng.).
66. 32 Geo. 2, ch. 28 (1758) (Eng.).
67. Plank, supra note 4, at 514. Originally, insolvency statutes applied to debtors with
debts between 50 and 100 Pounds Sterling. Later this was increased to 1,000 to 2,000 Pounds
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C. The American Bankruptcy Experience
Given the colonists' familiarity with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
English law, it is likely that English law influenced the development of similar
laws in the colonies and ultimately the formulation of the first federal
bankruptcy law. However, neither colonial statutes nor the first federal statutes
were carbon copies of English law. In every colony creditors were given the
power to execute against a debtor's goods and to imprison a debtor who refused
to pay.69 Some colonies regulated bankruptcy, others regulated insolvency, and
some had laws applicable to both.70 Like their English counterparts, colonial
bankruptcy laws were generally limited to involuntary actions against
merchants, whereas insolvency laws provided debtors with a means to obtain
relief from debtor's prison.7
Only Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania had statutes
directly modeled on the English acts.72 Delaware established an innovative
system that allowed certain debtors to be released from prison if they were over
a certain age, were responsible for small children, or if they had a small debt
and were willing to provide indentured service for up to six months." "Georgia
provided no relief of debtors from either debts or imprisonment for debt."74 For
a short time, Virginia law provided for capital punishment for fraudulent
debtors.75
Apparently, congressional power to legislate a national bankruptcy law
was incorporated into the United States Constitution with little debate. The
subject of bankruptcy was raised late in the proceedings at the Federal
Convention of 1787 by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina.76 He suggested
that a clause be added to the Full Faith and Credit Clause "'to establish the
uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies and respecting the damages
arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange." 77 John Rutledge, also from
South Carolina, suggested that the delegates add a power "'to establish uniform
laws on the subject ofbankruptcies.' 78 Two days later, on September 3, 1787,
the bankruptcy clause was approved.79 The provision provides that Congress
69. Id. at 518.
70. Id. at 518-25.
71. See Frimet, supra note 4, at 165.
72. Plank, supra note 4, at 520 n.165.
73. Id. at 522.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 521 n.169.
76. Frimet, supra note 4, at 164.
77. Id. (quoting CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HIsTORY 5
(1935)).
78. Olmstead, supra note 4, at 831.
79. Frimet, supra note 4, at 164. The sole statesman who voted nay was Connecticut's
Roger Sherman, who observed that "bankruptcies were in some cases punishable with death, by
the laws of England; and he did not choose to grant a power by which that might be done [in the
United States]." Olmstead, supra note 4, at 831. "Some historians claim that Sherman only voted
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has the power "[t]o establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States .... 80
Given the dearth of debate about the Bankruptcy Clause, it is difficult to
tell what was in the drafters' minds. However, many historians suggest that
congressional regulation of bankruptcy was simply an extension of the
commerce power designed to provide uniformity for commercial transactions
throughout the country."'
Although the Constitution gave Congress the power to enact a uniform,
national bankruptcy law, between 1787 and 1898 federal bankruptcy law
applied in only sixteen years. In response to periods of economic instability,
Congress enacted four bankruptcy statutes-three of which remained in effect
for only short periods of time. Each time Congress considered bankruptcy
legislation, debate focused upon whether bankruptcy laws also included
insolvency laws, issues of state or federal supremacy, and regional political
interests.82
Congress passed the first federal bankruptcy law on April 4, 1800 in
response to the economic panics of 1792 and 17978 3 The 1800 Act was
designed as a temporary measure that would terminate in five years, but was
repealed after only three years.84 It was similar to the 1732 George statute but
also contained features drawn from the Pennsylvania model." Bankruptcy was
purely a creditor's remedy involuntarily applicable to merchants who
committed acts of bankruptcy. Fraudulent acts by bankrupts were criminal
offenses, but not punishable by death. Commissioners with powers similar to
English commissioners were appointed by federal courts to supervise the
bankruptcy process. Discharge of the debts of a cooperative debtor was
allowed, but before the discharge was granted, the bankruptcy commissioners
were required to certify to the federal judge that the debtor had cooperated and
that two-thirds of the creditors had consented to the discharge.86 Modest
nay because Connecticut had their own bankruptcy law at the time and there was a fear of
potential conflict with a federal law." Frimet, supra note 4, at 164.
80. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
81. See, e.g., Bradshaw, supra note 4, at 746.
82. For amore comprehensive discussion ofthe development ofAmericanbankruptcy
law see WARREN, supra note 77, Frimet, supra note 4, and Tabb, History, supra note 4. Charles
Tabb categorizes constitutional issues generated by the Bankruptcy Clause as follows: (1) What
constitutes "the subject of bankruptcies"? (2) Is a bankruptcy law "uniform"? (3) Is state law
regulating the relationship between debtors and creditors preempted by federal law? (4) What
is the relationship between the Bankruptcy Clause and other constitutional provisions such as
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial? See Tabb,
History, supra note 4, at 43-50.
83. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800), repealed by Act of Dec. 19,
1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (1803). This act facilitated "a discharge for some of the prominent
financiers [of the American Revolution], including Robert Morris, who had been ruined in
1797." See Tabb, History, supra note 4, at 15.
84. Ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (1803) (repealing 1800 Act).
85. See supra note 82.
86. Ch. 19, § 36, 2 Stat. at 31.
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exemptions, such as necessary wearing apparel and bedding, were permitted. 7
At the time the Act was repealed in 1803, critics complained that "[s]mall
dividends were paid, and many of the discharged debtors were high-rolling
speculators who went through bankruptcy and then started their operations
anew. In addition, travel to the distant federal courts was difficult. Finally,
agricultural interests were outraged at the perceived favoritism of mercantile
groups. 88
Between 1803 and the enactment of the next federal bankruptcy law in
1841, insolvency and bankruptcy were governed by state law. In 1819 the
United States Supreme Court held that state insolvency law could not
constitutionally discharge pre-existing debts." This was followed by a ruling
in 1827 that state law could not provide for discharge of a debt owed to a
citizen of another state.9 The combination of these rulings created problems
during the economic depression of 1819 and 1820 because there was no federal
law by which debtors could discharge all debts.9' As a consequence,
"[t]hroughout the 1820s attempts were made to pass a bill permitting voluntary
bankruptcy for [both] ... merchant[s] and non-merchant[s]."' These "efforts
were rebuffed by an alliance of southerners, who opposed any federal
bankruptcy bill, and others who believed that voluntary bankruptcy was
unconstitutional."'93 However, some debtor relief emerged through the abolition
of imprisonment for debt at the federal level in 1833 and by many states during
the 1830s and 1840s.
The Panic of 1837, combined with the victory by the Whigs over the
Democrats in the 1840 election, resulted in adoption of a second bankruptcy
law in 1841. The 1841 Act was the first to authorize voluntary bankruptcy
and to grant relief to non-merchants. Likely drafted by Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story, it "was a coordinated, simple, and short act" modeled after the
Massachusetts insolvency law of 1838.9' The act vested jurisdiction in the
district court "in the nature of summary proceedings in equity," directed the
liquidation of assets and distribution to creditors, and replaced bankruptcy
commissioners with an assignee.96 A bankrupt was allowed basic exemptions,
but was not permitted to invoke state exemption laws.97 Few debts were
excepted from the discharge, but there were a number of grounds for denying
87. Id. § 5, 2 Stat. at 23.
88. See Tabb, History, supra note 4, at 15.
89. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819).
90. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 255 (1827).
91. See Tabb, History, supra note 4, at 15.
92. Id. at 16.
93. Id.
94. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841), repealed by Act of Mar. 3,
1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843).
95. Tabb, History, supra note 4, at 17.
96. Ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. at 445.
97. Id. § 3, 5 Stat. at 443.
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discharge, including preferring creditors. Commissioners no longer certify a
discharge to the court. Instead a district court conducts a hearing on discharge."
Finally, the debtor could raise the discharge as an affirmative defense in
subsequent actions.
The 1841 Act went into effect in February of 1842 but was repealed a year
later. It was disfavored by creditors and bankrupts alike. Creditors saw
bankrupts "disavow legitimate debts without any thought of making
restitution."99 Bankrupts "found that the Act preserved state liens, but not the
state exemptions [in] ... property.'
100
The years following the repeal of the 1841 Act brought prosperity and,
consequently, no need for a new federal bankruptcy law. States experimented
with insolvency laws. At the same time, England "liberalized its bankruptcy
law in favor of debtors by abolishing the requirement of creditor consent to the
discharge in 1842, allowing voluntary bankruptcy in 1844, and extending
eligibility to non-merchants in 1861."'0'
The panic of 1857 and the financial cataclysm of the Civil War, like prior
financial crises, spurred consideration of another bankruptcy act in 1867.l02
This act included both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy and made
corporations eligible for relief. An oath of allegiance to the United States was
required of every petitioning bankrupt.' 3 The act allowed involuntary
bankruptcy to be initiated against any person and expanded the list of acts
supporting an involuntary petition.'04 Federal district courts were granted
original jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters as courts of bankruptcy. 0 5 These
courts appointed one or more "registers in bankruptcy, to assist the judge of the
district court in the performance of his duties." ' 6
In 1874 new federal legislation authorizing the formulation of composition
agreements amended the 1867 Act.' 7 The forerunner of modem reorganization
plans, this act required bankrupts to pay a percentage of current income to retire
past debts. A majority of creditors holding three-fourths in value of the
outstanding claims could bind the named creditors by accepting the
composition.'08 The "best interests" test required that creditors be paid as much
98. Id. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443-44.
99. Frimet, supra note 4, at 179.
100. Id.
101. Tabb, History, supra note 4, at 18 (footnotes omitted). See generally Frimet,
supra note 4, at 180 (describing activities after repeal of the 1841 Act).
102. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867), repealed by Act of June
7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878); Frimet, supra note 4, at 180-83; Tabb, History, supra note
4, at 19.
103. Ch. 176, § 11, 14 Stat. at 521.
104. Id. § 39, 14 Stat. at 536.
105. Id. § 1, 14 Stat. at517.
106. Id. § 3, 14 Stat. at 518.
107. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, 18 Stat. 178, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch.
160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878).
108. Ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. at 183.
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as they would receive in a liquidation." 9
Congress repealed the 1867 Act in 1878, largely at the insistence of
creditors complaining about "small dividends, high fees and expenses, and
lengthy delays. Northern creditors who had hoped to use the bankruptcy law
to facilitate collection from southern debtors were disappointed.""0 However,
bankrupts also did poorly under the 1867 law."' "Due to the inclusion of
numerous grounds for denying discharge, only about one-third of the debtors
received a discharge.""..2
Finally, in 1898 Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act which remained in
effect for eighty years.' The Bankruptcy Act fundamentally changed the
balance between creditors and debtors. All prior bankruptcy laws limited a
debtor's discharge, conditioned it upon creditor consent or at least the absence
of objection by a specified percentage of creditors, and required a minimum
dividend to creditors. The Bankruptcy Act abolished these restrictions and
severely limited the grounds for denying a discharge." 4 The Act did not permit
federal exemptions." 5 Creditors exercised control through their power to elect
a trustee and through creditors' committees.
In addition to facilitating debtor relief, the Bankruptcy Act also
implemented a system for efficient estate administration and distribution. "6 As
with the 1867 Act, federal district courts sat as "'courts of bankruptcy."'
' ' 17
Theirbankruptcyjurisdiction was independent from theirjurisdiction as a court
of law and as a court of equity. For bankruptcy proceedings it included both
legal and equitable jurisdiction." 8 Referees in bankruptcy, appointed by the
district courts, did the bulk of the judicial and administrative work.
Sitting in bankruptcy, district courts or referees had exclusive summary
jurisdiction over administrative proceedings. The term summary jurisdiction
was derived from historical bankruptcy court summary proceedings in which
formal pleadings were not required." 9 The district court also exercised
109. Id.
110. See Tabb, History, supra note 4, at 19.
111. Id. at20.
112. Id. (footnote omitted).
113. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). This Act continued until the
current Bankruptcy Code became effective in 1979.
114. Ch. 541, § 16, 30 Stat. at 550.
115. In 1902 the Supreme Court held that state exemption laws did not run afoul of
the bankruptcy clause mandate for uniform laws. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181,
188-90 (1902).
116. Ch. 541, §§ 61-64, 30 Stat. at 550. The Supreme Court was given the power to
prescribe rules and orders for the procedure.
117. Id. § 2, 30 Stat. at 550.
118. Section 2 of Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Act granted courts of bankruptcy
"such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in
bankruptcy proceedings." Id. § 2, 30 Stat. at 545.
119. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 23.02[l ] (James Wm. Moore & Lawrence P. King
eds., 14th ed. 1976).
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concurrent jurisdiction with state courts over many bankruptcy-related issues.
Described as plenary jurisdiction, state and federal courts had concurrent
authority to adjudicate issues between the bankruptcy trustee or receiver and
third parties concerning property not in the possession of the bankruptcy court.
If the adverse party did not consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction, a case
involving a plenary matter could be brought only in a court that would have
jurisdiction in a non-bankruptcy context-a state court, or if subject matter
jurisdiction existed on an alternate basis, a federal court not sitting in
bankruptcy.' Litigation over which court had jurisdiction was frequent and
the distinction between summary jurisdiction and plenary jurisdiction was the
subject of much dispute.
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act several times between 1898 and the
onset of the Depression.' Initially, amendments were made to moderate the
pro-debtor orientation of the act. Amendments included additional grounds for
denial of discharge," additional debts excepted from the discharge,'3 and an
increase in the number of defined acts of bankruptcy. 4 Corporations became
eligible for voluntary bankruptcy in 1910.125 Penal provisions were
strengthened considerably in 1926.16 Unsuccessful efforts were made to repeal
the law in 1902, 1903, 1909, and 1910.
' A27
During the Depression, Congress passed several pro-debtor amendments
that facilitated rehabilitation through bankruptcy. 2 1 In 1933 compositions
became more widely available, and agricultural and railroad compositions were
permitted. 2 9 In 1934 Congress authorized corporations"' and municipalities to
reorganize.' 3 ' Subsequent amendments included provisions allowing farmers
to keep their farms and facilitating railroad reorganizations. 3 2 In 1938
120. 2id. 23.12.
121. See supra note 82.
122. Act of Jan. 7, 1922, ch. 22, 42 Stat. 354; Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 153, 39 Stat.
999; Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 797, 798.
123. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 6, 44 Stat. 662, 663-64; Act of June 25, 1910,
ch. 412, § 6, 36 Stat. 838, 839-40.
124. Ch. 406, § 3, 44 Stat. at 663.
125. Ch. 412, § 3, 36 Stat. at 839.
126. Ch. 406, § 11, 44 Stat. at 665-66.
127. See supra note 82; Tabb, History, supra note 4, at 27.
128. See supra note 82.
129. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467, 1467-82.
130. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911, 912-25.
131. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798. InAshton v. Cameron County Water
Improvement District No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 532 (1936), the Court overturned this statute.
Congress passed another version in 1937 which was upheld by the Court. See United States v.
Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938).
132. Frazier-Lemke Act, ch. 869,48 Stat. 1289 (1934); Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 774,
49 Stat. 911. Both statutes ultimately survived constitutional challenge. See generally Wright v.
Vinton Branch of the Mountain TrustBank, 300 U.S. 440,470 (1937) (deciding that a provision
authorizing agricultural compositions is valid); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 675 (1935) (holding that railroads may
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Congress passed the comprehensive Chandler Act.'33 The Chandler Act
revised virtually all the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. The Chandler Act
updated substantive and procedural provisions in liquidation cases, improved
bankruptcy administration, and reworked the reorganization provisions into
Chapters 10, 11, 12, and 13.34 Over the following forty years Congress
amended the Bankruptcy Act dozens of times, but only as to specific and
discrete issues.35
Statutory provisions generally governed bankruptcy procedure, but under
the authority of Section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court
periodically enacted general orders in bankruptcy. In 1960 Congress authorized
an advisory committee on bankruptcy rules to craft rules of bankruptcy
procedure to be approved by the Supreme Court. 36 After years of effort by the
rules committee, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure took effect in
1973.
In 1970 Congress created a commission to study and report on the
Bankruptcy Act. 137 The commission filed its report in 1973.38 Five years later,
after almost a decade of study and debate about bankruptcy reform, the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 replaced the Bankruptcy Act with the
Bankruptcy Code.
39
III. ATrRIUTES OF LAW AND EQUITY N THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS
Several themes emerge out of the serpentine history of Anglo-American
bankruptcy law. First, neither bankruptcy law nor bankruptcy courts can claim
roots in English courts of equity. Bankruptcy remedies and insolvency rights
have always been a product of legislative enactment rather than case-by-case
determination in common law or equity courts.
Second, bankruptcy and insolvency laws inherently embody a compromise
of disparate social and economic objectives. Economic transactions necessarily
generate competing as well as complementary interests. All economic
endeavors entail risk; some endeavors succeed, some fail. Economic hardship
can be due to circumstances beyond a debtor's control, to the debtor's own
mistake, irresponsibility, or dishonesty, or to a combination of both. It is in the
interest of every creditor to be paid, but if full payment cannot be effected, it
is in society's interest that all creditors be treated predictably and that debtors
be returned to productivity. The differing needs of debtors and creditors have
reorganize).
133. Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978).
134. Id.
135. See supra note 82.
136. See Lawrence P. King, The History and Development of the Bankruptcy Rules,
70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 217, 218-26 (1996).
137. Id. at 236.
138. See supra note 133.
139. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
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not changed substantially over time, but legislative response to them has
changed."4 Until the middle of the nineteenth century, bankruptcy law was
decidedly pro-creditor. Since then it has oscillated between provisions favoring
debtors and those favoring creditors, depending on economic and political
pressures at a given time.
Over three hundred years ago, Daniel Defoe authored an "Essay upon
Projects" commenting on English bankruptcy law. His writings were designed
to influence Parliament's consideration of the Statute of Anne.' 4' In 1697 Defoe
identified four commercial actors whose interests were affected by bankruptcy
law:
(1.) There is the Honest Debtor, who fails by visible
Necessity, Losses, Sickness, Decay of Trade, or the like.
(2.) The Knavish, Designing, or Idle, Extravagant
Debtor, who fails because either he has run out his Estate in
Excesses, or on purpose to cheat and abuse his Creditors.
(3.) There is the moderate Creditor, who seeks but his
own, but will omit no lawful Means to gain it, and yet will
hear reasonable and just Arguments and Proposals.
(4.) There is the Rigorous Severe Creditor, that values
not whether the Debtor be Honest Man or Knave, Able, or
Unable; but will have his Debt, whether it be to be had or no;
without Mercy, without Compassion, full of Ill Language,
Passion, and Revenge.' 42
He then defined the legislative problem faced by Parliament:
How to make a Law to suit to all these, is the Case: That
a necessary Favour might be shown to thefirst, in Pity and
Compassion to the Unfortunate, in Commiseration of
140. As a seasoned law professor stated with regard to law school examinations, "The
questions never change-only the answers do." Indeed, in describing the history of bankruptcy
in the United States, Charles Warren observed in 1935 that:
Bankruptcy is a gloomy and depressing subject. The
law of bankruptcy is a dry and discouraging topic.
But the history of bankruptcy legislation as seen in
the Congressional debates is colorful; for not only
does it reflect the changes in viewpoints and in
economic conditions in our National history, but it
also reminds us of how frequently the views and
conditions of today are mere repetitions of the past.
WARREN, supra note 77, at 3. Warren characterized the time between 1789-1827 as the period
of the creditor, 1827-1861 as the period of the debtor, and 1861-1935 as the period of national
interest. See id. at 3, 49, 95.
141. Weisberg, supra note 4, at 5.
142. DANIEL DEFOE, AN ESSAY UPON PROJECrs 206-07 (1697).
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Casualty and Poverty, which no man is exempt from the
danger of. That a due Rigor and Restraint be laid upon the
second, that Villany and Knavery might not be encourag'dby
a Law. That a due Care be taken of the third, that mens
Estates may, as far as can be, be secur'd to them. And due
Limits set to the last, that no man may have an unlimited
Power over his Fellow-Subjects, to the Ruin of both Life and
Estate.
A century later the American colonies faced the same dilemma:
How to ensure the maximum repayment of debt while
recognizing that some debtors inevitably would be unable to
pay. Too harsh treatment of insolvent debtors wasted the
abilities and energies of potentially productive persons and
created a burden on state and local governments to maintain
debtors' prisons. Too lenient treatment allowed dishonest
debtors or debtors who were less than fully committed to the
ideal of repaying their debts to avoid their obligations."
The historical dilemma sounds familiar because it is at the heart of current
congressional debate about the Bankruptcy Code. How should the Code
balance a creditor's rights to collect lawful debts against the societal utility of
returning a debtor to economic productivity? Should the law distinguish
between types of creditors, and if so, which ones deserve to be paid first? How
should the Code distinguish the honest, responsible, but unfortunate debtor
deserving of relief from the dishonest or irresponsible debtor who takes
advantage of creditors and societal generosity? Proposals for means testing,
restricted eligibility for Chapter 7, and specialized treatment for credit-card
debt or family-support debt address twenty-first century manifestations of age-
old issues.
These fundamental social and economic issues are best identified,
discussed, and resolved in the legislative process. In a sense, all bankruptcy
laws balance equities, not between individual litigants, but among different
segments of society. The legislative forum is particularly suited to consider and
balance the rights and competing interests of debtors (businesses, consumers,
and tortfeasors) and creditors (lenders, trade creditors, investors, and tort
claimants) to benefit society as a whole. Many may criticize the legislative
process or result, but it is Congress's function to consider the interests of
groups in society and to set social policy. The Bankruptcy Code, like its
predecessor statutes, embodies compromises reached in the democratic process,
143. Id. at 207-08. For further discussion and analysis of Defoe's essays, see
Weisberg, supra note 4, at 5-10.
144. Plank, supra note 4, at 525.
[Vol. 50: 275
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss2/3
BANKRUPTCY COURTS As COURTS OF EQUITY
incorporating social and economic policies which favor some groups in society
over others.
The third observation of the history of bankruptcy is that bankruptcy law
has always utilized both legal and equitable mechanisms to implement social
and economic objectives. English bankruptcy and insolvency laws borrowed
from both legal and equitable traditions. The use of a commission resembled
ajury, lending popular legitimacy to the process. Allowing creditors input into
the commissioners' determination of whether a certificate of conformity would
be issued enhanced popular participation. The collective nature of the
bankruptcy process borrowed from the equitable tradition by using a
comprehensive proceeding which aggregated bankrupts' creditors and
marshaled all of their assets. The commissioner's authority to compel debtors
to answer questions concerning liabilities and assets paralleled the chancellor's
power to require parties to testify and to order specific relief. Remedies for
noncompliance resembled criminal sanctions in the form of fines, mutilation,
or in the extreme, execution.
The traditions of both law and equity are woven into current bankruptcy
practice as well. Bankruptcy, whether by liquidation or reorganization, serves
admittedly equitable objectives. It is designed to provide comprehensive
resolution of all claims against a debtor just as early English law did. The
automatic stay, a statutory injunction, becomes effective upon the filing of a
petition. The broad definition of property of the estate and strong-arm powers
are designed to marshal assets. All creditors are included and receive notice of
important facets of the process. Avoidance of liens, sale of estate assets free
and clear of liens or interests, equitable subordination of claims, and
compelling debtors to account for their past financial affairs all resemble
specific equitable relief obtainable in non-bankruptcy courts.
Equitable traditions are also apparent in certain procedures employed in
bankruptcy case administration. With the exception ofcontestedmatters subject
to Rule 9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,' 45 procedures used
in the main bankruptcy case do not always follow the litigation model. Indeed,
the administrative process is governed by separate rules ofprocedure.'46 Some
requests are made by application or proof of claim, rather than by motion.
Some proceedings are abbreviated. Claims can be allowed without being
adjudicated; they may be estimated rather than finally determined. Creditors
have the right to notice of impending action, but what constitutes "notice and
a hearing" is subject to the court's discretion. 47 Chapter 7 cases without
145. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.
146. Id. pts. I-VI, VIII, IX.
147. See I I U.S.C. § 102(1) (1994); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9007. Section 102(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code states as follows:
(1) "after notice and a hearing", or a
similar phrase-
(A) means after such notice as is
appropriate in the particular circumstances, and such
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reaffirmation agreements, adversary proceedings, or contested matters can be
entirely an administrative process without any court appearance being required
of the debtor. 4 '
Bankruptcy administration is frequently characterized as an equitable
receivership, but its scope and effect are significantly broader. A receivership
is a remedy for administration and determination of creditors' interests in
specific property. It affects only designated property and designated creditors.
Because a determination of a creditor's rights is relative and limited to the
designated property, creditors not having an interest in the subject property are
unaffected. Moreover, a receivership does not determine whether a deficiency
is owed to a creditor, nor does it affect a creditor's rights which are unrelated
to the res being administered. For example, in a real estate receivership the
relative rights of creditors in and to the real property is determined, but
creditors' rights in other assets or against the owner of the real property are not.
In contrast, bankruptcy is not limited to specific property. Instead, it
focuses upon a specific debtor and, therefore, includes all of the debtor's
property and creditors. In addition, the bankruptcy process, whether ending in
discharge by liquidation or reorganization, fixes all of a creditor's legal rights
against the debtor and in the debtor's property. 49 A discharge or confirmed
plan of reorganization has the same res judicata effect as a determination on the
merits of a creditor's claim; it liquidates the debt, fixes the amount of recovery,
and forecloses future collection. Due to the breath of the potential impact upon
their rights and interests, in a bankruptcy case, creditors are entitled to prior
notice and opportunity to object to many different types of action.' ° In the
administrative process, creditors are also entitled to jury trials on personal
injury claims and recovery claims brought by a trustee if the creditor has filed
no proof of claim.
opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in the
particular circumstances; but
(B) authorizes an act without an actual
hearing if such notice is given properly and if-
(i) such a hearing is not requested
timely by a party in interest; or
(ii) there is insufficient time for a
hearing to be commenced before such act must be
done, and the court authorizes such act....
148. Since 1987 discharge hearings have no longer been required except in
conjunction with reaffirmation agreements for pro se debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 524(d) (1994).
149. In 1857 the United States Supreme Court recognized this fundamental distinction
between bankruptcy and an equity receivership. See Commercial Bank v. Buckner, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 108, 122 (1857).
150. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002,2004,2015,3017,3018, 6004, 6006, 6007, 6008.
In Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902), the United States Supreme Court
held that the Bankruptcy Act satisfied the creditors' constitutional right to due process by
providing notice of the first meeting of creditors and each subsequent step in administration. Id.
at 191-92. A creditor has the same right to due process under the Code. See, e.g., Reliable Elec.
Co. v. Olson Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620, 622 (10th Cir. 1984).
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A blend of equitable and legal procedures is also apparent in contested
matters and adversary proceedings. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are,
in large part, adopted into Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure.' 5 ' Adversary proceedings and contested matters are triggered by
motion or complaint; require traditional pleadings, service of process, and
written response; and are determined by entry of a judgment or order.
Litigation progresses in substantially the same manner and format as in state
courts and federal district courts.'52 Jury trials can be conducted by a district
court or, if authorized, by the bankruptcy court.M3 Presentation of evidence is
subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Like courts of more general
jurisdiction, bankruptcy courts can grant both legal and equitable relief.'54 For
example, the bankruptcy court may determine the debtor's liability on a debt
or the nature and scope of a security interest under state law, then equitably
subordinate the claim under section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code' 5 or
determine it to be nondischargeable under section 523.156
The bankruptcy system is supplemented also by criminal law. 57 Debtors
must affirm the truth and accuracy of the contents of their schedules and
statement of affairs under penalty of perjury.
IV. JUDICIAL REFERENCES TO THE BANKRUPTCY COURT AS A COURT OF
EQUITY
This is the fundamental question: Why do judges, parties, and scholars
colloquially refer to the bankruptcy court as a court of equity when neither its
historical origin nor its current functions justify this characterization? While
there may be an infinite variety of unarticulated meanings ascribed to the
phrase "court of equity," common usage reveals at least three.
Characterization of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity is and has been
used to define the scope of the court'sjurisdiction and authority. The evocative
nature of the phrase "court of equity," which conjures up a variety of popular
sentiments-fairness, justness, right dealing, inclusion, and flexibility-has
also been used to legitimize the social policy embedded in bankruptcy law.
Often the phrase is also used as lubricating language to justify a conclusion or
result, particularly when the result is not a result of application of statutory law.
As a court of equity, ajudge may justify expansion, restriction, or modification
of statutory law to achieve justice in a particular case. Finally, powers of a
151. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 advisory committee's note.
152. The procedure followed varies from court to court as required by the particular
legal culture and local practice of a community or caseload pressure.
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (1994).
154. The finality of the decision is dependent upon the nature of the issues
determined. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1994).
155. 11 U.S.C. § 510 (1994).
156. Id. § 523.
157. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-57, 1961, 2516, 3057,3284, 6001 (1994).
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court of equity are often invoked by litigants who desire a result that seems fair
to them, but that may be at variance with the law.
A. Court ofEquity Used to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction and.Authority
Like Congress, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
Supreme Court focused on the jurisdiction of federal courts sitting in
bankruptcy. References to the bankruptcy court as a court of equity were most
often used in a technical context to define the scope of exclusive or original
bankruptcy jurisdiction. The technical approach probably arose because legal
and equitable claims gave rise to different causes of action prior to the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Generally, district courts had
jurisdiction over claims pled in equity, for which the trial was conducted to the
court, or over claims pled at law, for which a jury trial was conducted.
However, a district court's jurisdiction in bankruptcy was not characterized as
either; instead, bankruptcyjurisdiction covered both legal and equitable claims.
In 1871 the Supreme Court considered whether a determination ofproperty
ownership fell within the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867.15' The 1867 Act granted federal district courts
exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy administration and distribution, but
concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts and state courts for "suits at law or
in equity... brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming
an adverse interest."'' 59 In dicta the Supreme Court noted that matters subject
to exclusive bankruptcyjurisdiction could be resolved in a summary manner. 6 '
In contrast, matters falling outside exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction but within
the court's concurrentjurisdiction required a full-blown trial in accordance with
the legal or equitable nature of the claim. For example, an action to determine
the rights of third parties in specific property fell outside the court's exclusive
bankruptcy jurisdiction, but within the scope of the court's concurrent
jurisdiction.'
The Supreme Court followed this holding in Lathrop v. Drake12 when it
held that an action by an assignee in bankruptcy to recover assets could be
brought by suit, in law or equity, in a circuit court sitting in a district other than
the one where the bankruptcy case was pending. 63 In Lathrop the Court
utilized the terms "original jurisdiction" to describe a district court's
bankruptcy jurisdiction and "ancillary proceedings" to describe concurrent
jurisdiction over suits at law or in equity which impacted the bankruptcy
158. Smith v. Mason, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 419 (1871).
159. Id. at 420.
160. Id. at430.
161. Id. at432.
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case.
164
Using different labels, the Supreme Court recognized this jurisdictional
distinction with regard to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in Bardes v. Hawarden
Bank.'65 In Bardes the Court held that a trustee's suit asserting title to property
must be brought by an independent action at law or in equity. ' 66 The Court
analyzed the district court's exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction "at law and in
equity" granted by the Act.'67 The court defined proceedings within the scope
of bankruptcy jurisdiction as "generally" being "in the nature of proceedings
in equity" and speculated that Congress's reference to jurisdiction over matters
"at law" was limited to the court's powers to punish debtors and others for
bankruptcy crimes.' 8 Consistent with its analysis of the 1867 Act, the Court
then characterized actions at law or in equity lying outside bankruptcy
jurisdiction as plenary matters. ,61
References in Lathrop and Bardes to the court's equitable powers in the
bankruptcy administrative process were dicta; these cases focused on the
distinction between original and plenary jurisdiction under the 1867 Act.
However, the dicta of Bardes and Lathrop became precedent when the cases
were mis-cited in LocalLoan Co. v. Hunt'70 for the proposition that bankruptcy
courts are courts of equity. Local Loan cited Bardes for the proposition that
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court "in law" is limited to criminal matters, and
that courts of bankruptcy are "essentially courts of equity, and their
proceedings inherently proceedings in equity."'' Not only is the holding of
Bardes overlooked, Bardes is misquoted. The error is compounded by citations
to Bardes, Lathrop, andLocalLoan in subsequent cases for the proposition that
bankruptcy courts are inherently courts of equity.'1
7
164. Id. at 517-18.
165. 178 U.S. 524 (1900).
166. Id. at 538.
167. Id. at 534; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 545 (1898).
168. Bardes, 178 U.S. at 535. The Court stated:
Proceedings in bankruptcy generally are in the
nature of proceedings in equity; and the words "at
law," in the opening sentence conferring on the courts
ofbankruptcy "suchjurisdiction, at law and in equity,
as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in
bankruptcy proceedings," may have been inserted to
meet clause 4, authorizing the trial and punishment of
offences, thejurisdiction overwhich mustnecessarily
be at law and not in equity.
Id.
169. Id. at 532.
170. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
171. Id. at 240.
172. Local Loan has been cited for this proposition in almost 1,500 subsequent
opinions. See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966); United States Nat'l Bank v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 331 U.S. 28, 36 (1947); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 732 (1946);
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,306 (1939); Continental 11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
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These erroneous references took on new significance in Katchen v.
Landy.'73 The issue in Katchen was whether a defendant in a preference action
brought by a trustee was entitled to ajury trial. Building offprevious cases, the
Supreme Court accepted what had by repetition become fact-that the
bankruptcy court is a court of equity. Adding the traditional notion that jury
trials are unavailable for equitable claims, the Court concluded that a creditor
had no right to a jury trial on issues which arose in the equitable bankruptcy
administrative process if the creditor voluntarily submitted itself to the process
by filing a proof of claim. 74
The Court applied this reasoning to the Bankruptcy Code in
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg'7 s even though the jurisdictional provisions
accompanying the Code abandoned the distinction between summary
jurisdiction and plenary jurisdiction and are devoid of reference to bankruptcy
courts as courts of equity. In Granfinanciera the Supreme Court considered
whether defendants in a fraudulent conveyance action brought by a bankruptcy
trustee were entitled to ajury trial. Although the focus of the opinion was the
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, the Court relied upon its prior analysis
in Katchen that the bankruptcy court's role in the administrative process was
an equitable one. Consistent with the Katchen reasoning, the Court held that
because the defendants had not submitted a claim against the bankruptcy estate,
thereby triggering the equitable claims process, they retained their right to a
jury trial.
76
Granfinanciera adopts the historical mistake made in Local Loan that, in
matters pertaining to bankruptcy administration, 77 bankruptcy courts sit in
equity. Accordingly, parties are not entitled to ajury trial. But the conclusion
is wholly unsupported by statutory reference in either Title 28 or Title 11. It is
instead the perpetuation of judicial lore.
It is not clear why the Court defined the bankruptcy case administration as
an equitable process in Local Loan. Such dicta was neither necessary to the
holding nor added anything to the Court's reasoning. The reference may have
been gratuitous, it may have been due to the need for more expansive
bankruptcy court discretion to address social and economic needs of the
Depression, or it may have been an outgrowth of the movement to harmonize
equity and legal proceedings which ultimately resulted in the adoption of the
Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 675 (1935).
173. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
174. See id. at 336-38. This conclusion is somewhat ironic in that the Bankruptcy Act
and applicable rules authorized jury trials on involuntary petitions and in dischargeability
actions, both part of the summary administrative process. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,
30 Stat. 551 (1898) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 42(a) (1925-26)). The Judicial Conference issued
a resolution that the referee in bankruptcy should not conduct the jury trial under Section 19(a).
ANN. REP. OF THE PROC. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. 396 (1960).
175. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
176. Id. at 58.
177. These are defined as "core proceedings" in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1994).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Whatever the rationale, LocalLoan's
characterization of the bankruptcy court's role in case administration as a court
of equity opened the proverbial Pandora's Box. Katchen merely took the
characterization one step further, likening the equitable nature of administrative
proceedings to those equitable actions for which no right to jury trial existed.
Granfinanciera applied the reasoning to the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, by
judicial decree, rather than by congressional directive, the bankruptcy
administration process is now defined as an equitable process. Although the
historical distinction between legal and equitable claims was abolished by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, through judicial precedent the bankruptcy
administrative process retains an equitable character. As demonstrated in
Katchen and Granfinanciera, this historical holdover affects parties' rights to
a jury trial on certain issues.
B. Court of Equity Linked to the Social Policy Behind the Bankruptcy
Law and to Judicial Discretion
With the Depression and congressional expansion of debtors' rights,
designation as a court of equity took on a moralistic tone which justified and
amplified the social policies underpinning the Bankruptcy Act. As a court of
equity, the bankruptcy court could properly use broad discretion in service of
social policy.
The first of the social policy cases was LocalLoan Co. v. Hunt 78 in which
the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court could enjoin a creditor from
enforcing a wage assignment after discharge. 179 Under the Act, a debtor
received a decree of discharge, which could be asserted as an affirmative
defense to a creditor's subsequent state court collection action. The question
posed in Local Loan was whether the debtor could affirmatively enjoin a
creditor by action brought in the federal district court which sat in the
bankruptcy case.'80 Until -Local Loan, federal courts sitting in bankruptcy
declined to entertain such suits on the grounds that the effect of the discharge
was a matter to be determined by the court presiding over the subsequent
action. But, because the district court sat in equity, the Supreme Court
concluded that the debtor could obtain relief from it:
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to
"relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business
misfortunes." This purpose of the act has been again and
again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as
178. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
179. Id. at 244.
180. Id. at 238.
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private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate
debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he
owns at the time of the bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of preaxisting debt.''
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's injunction, noting that district
courts sitting in bankruptcy are obligated to apply the Bankruptcy Act to
effectuate its purpose and policy and that "[l]ocal rules subversive of that result
cannot be accepted as controlling the action of a federal court."'
82
The next year, the Court considered the bankruptcy court's authority to
enjoin holders of collateral notes secured by mortgage bonds from selling the
bonds when the sale would hinder or prevent consummation of a railroad
reorganization plan.' 3 The Court affirmed the injunction again describing the
broad powers of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity:
By § 2 of the Bankruptcy Act (U.S.C. Title 11, § 11), courts
of bankruptcy are invested "with such jurisdiction at law and
in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction
in bankruptcy proceedings." They are essentially courts of
equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in
equity, the words "at law" probably having been inserted only
with regard to clause (4) of § 2, which confers authority to
arraign, try, and punish bankrupts and others for violations of
the act. Their adjudications and orders constitute in all
essential particulars decrees in equity. The power to issue an
injunction when necessary to prevent the defeat or
impairment of its jurisdiction is, therefore, inherent in a court
of bankruptcy, as it is in a duly established court of
equity. ....
... [C]ourts of bankruptcy are invested with such
authority in equity as will enable them to exercise original
jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings, including the power
to "make such orders, issue such process, and enter such
judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as
may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of
this act."...
The bankruptcy court, in granting the injunction, was
well within its power, either as a virtual court of equity, or
181. Id. at 244 (citation omitted) (quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
182. Id. at 245.
183. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co.,
294 U.S. 648, 650-51 (1935).
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under the broad provisions of § 2(15) of the Bankruptcy Act
or of § 262 of the Judicial Code.
8 4
The linkage between the bankruptcy court's equitable powers and the
social policies of the Bankruptcy Act is perhaps most clearly revealed in Justice
Douglas's opinion for the Court in the 1939 Pepper v. Litton' 5 decision. In
Pepper the Supreme Court considered whether the district court properly
disallowed a creditor's claim which previously had been adjudicated by a state
court.1 6 It is clear, both from the text and the tone of the opinion, that the Court
believed the creditor had manipulated and abused the legal process in state
court in order to obtain a determination in its favor by the bankruptcy court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's disallowance of the claim as
a means of correcting the injustice.' 7 Justice Douglas only briefly discussed the
Court's legal conclusion that the state court judgment did not act as resjudicata
to the validity of the claim, which would have been sufficient to dispose of the
matter. Instead, the bulk of the opinion concerns the bankruptcy court's
equitable authority to vitiate a creditor's fraud. Relying upon Local Loan Co.,
Justice Douglas wrote:
Consequently this Court has held that for many purposes
"courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and
theirproceedings inherently proceedings in equity." By virtue
of § 2 a bankruptcy court is a court of equity at least in the
sense that in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it
by the Act, it applies the principles and rules of equity
jurisprudence. ....
The bankruptcy courts have exercised these equitable
powers in passing on a wide range of problems arising out of
the administration of bankrupt estates. They have been
invoked to the end that fraud will not prevail, that substance
will not give way to form, that technical considerations will
not prevent substantial justice from being done. By reason of
the express provisions of § 2 these equitable powers are to be
exercised on the allowance of claims, a conclusion which is
fortified by § 57 (k). For certainly if, as provided in the latter
section, a claim which has been allowed may be later
"rejected in whole or in part, according to the equities of the
184. Id. at 675-76 (citations omitted) (quoting Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. 234, 240
(1934) and Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 546 (1898), respectively).
185. 308 U.S. 295 (1939). This opinion is truly the mother of all court of equity
opinions. It is cited in almost all subsequent Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that the
bankruptcy court is a court of equity.
186. Id. at 301.
187. Id. at 311.
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case," disallowance or subordination in light of equitable
considerations may originally be made.
As we have said, the bankruptcy court in passing on
allowance of claims sits as a court of equity. Hence these
rules governing the fiduciary responsibilities of directors and
stockholders come into play on allowance of their claims in
bankruptcy. In the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction the
bankruptcy court has the power to sift the circumstances
surrounding any claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not
done in the administration of the bankrupt estate.' 8
However, during the 1940s the Supreme Court backed away from
unlimited equitable discretion. Although the Court continued to identify
bankruptcy law with equitable purposes and to describe bankruptcy courts as
courts of equity, it limited the bankruptcy court's discretion to the terms of the
operative statute. In SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co."9 the
Court ruled that equitable doctrines and principles guided the bankruptcy court
only insofar as they were consistent with the Bankruptcy Act.'90 The
bankruptcy court could not, based on its own notion of equitable principles, act
inconsistently with the Act.' 9'
The Court continued to limit the bankruptcy court's equitable discretion in
Heiser v. Woodruff.'92 InHeiser the Supreme Court considered a Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision based on Pepper v. Litton.'93 The proceeding
188. Id. at 304-08 (citation and footnotes omitted) (quoting LocalLoan Co., 292 U.S.
at 240).
189. 310 U.S. 434 (1940).
190. Id. at 455.
191. The Court reasoned:
While a bankruptcy court cannot, because of its own
notions of equitable principles, refuse to award the
relief which Congress has accorded the bankrupt, the
real question is, what is the relief which Congress has
accorded the bankrupt and is it more likely to be
secured in a Chapter X or Chapter XI proceeding? In
answering it we cannot assume that Congress has
disregarded well settled principles of equity, the more
so when Congress itself has provided that the relief to
be given shall be "fair and equitable and feasible."
Good sense and legal tradition alike enjoin that an
enactment of Congress dealing with bankruptcy
should be read in harmony with the existing system
of equity jurisprudence of which it is a part.
Id. at 457.
192. 327 U.S. 726 (1946). Notably, in Heiser, Justice Douglas dissented from the
majority opinion. Heiser, 327 U.S. at 740. See Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945).
193. Heiser, 327 U.S. at 728.
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concerned allowance of the creditor's claim arising from a pre-petition money
judgment. Objectors contended that the judgment had been procured by fraud.
Relying upon Pepper v. Litton, the Tenth Circuit held that the bankruptcy
referee could reach behind the pre-petition adjudication to decide whether the
claim should be allowed. 94 Reversing the Tenth Circuit's decision, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that a bankruptcy court, in exercise of its equity
powers, could set aside fraudulent claims based on a "judgment where the issue
of fraud has not been previously adjudicated,"'95 but where the issue of fraud
had been previously litigated, the bankruptcy court was bound by the
determination. Even when a court sits in equity, it is nevertheless subject to the
"salutary principle of res judicata."'96 The Court reinforced limits on
bankruptcy court equitable discretion to statutory provisions in United States
NationalBankv. ChaseNationalBank, 97 but affirmed the exercise of equitable
discretion in determining whether a waiver of liens had taken place. 98
More recent use of the phrase of court of equity to support social policy
underlying the Bankruptcy Code is apparent inNLPB v. Bildisco & Bildisco.9 9
In Bildisco the Court analyzed whether a debtor-in-possession could reject a
collective bargaining agreement during a Chapter 1 1 reorganization.
Since the policy of Chapter 11 is to permit successful
rehabilitation of debtors, rejection should not be permitted
without a finding that that policy would be served by such
action. The Bankruptcy Court must make a reasoned finding
on the record why it has determined that rejection should be
permitted. Determining what would constitute a successful
rehabilitation involves balancing the interests of the affected
parties-the debtor, creditors, and employees. ....
The Bankruptcy Court is a court of equity, and in making
this determination it is in a very real sense balancing the
equities, as the Court of Appeals suggested. Nevertheless, the
Bankruptcy Court must focus on the ultimate goal of Chapter
11 when considering these equities. °°
The Supreme Court also has recently applied the restrictive trend in judicial
discretion with regard to the Code. Although bankruptcy courts continue to be
labeled courts of equity, recent opinions restrict the court's equitable discretion
194. Id.
195. Id. at 732.
196. Id. at 733.
197. 331 U.S. 28 (1947).
198. Id. at37.
199. 465 U.S. 513 (1984). Many lower court opinions use the phrase similarly, but
are too numerous to analyze each individually.
200. Id. at 527.
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to statutory provisions.20 ' For instance, in United States v. Noland 2 the
Supreme Court reversed a bankruptcy court's exercise of equitable discretion
in applying 11 U.S.C. § 510(c). The Court stated:
The judge-made doctrine of equitable subordination predates
Congress's revision of the Code in 1978.... [T]he Fifth
Circuit, in its influential opinion in In re Mobile Steel Co....
observed that the application of the doctrine was generally
triggered by a showing that the creditor had engaged in
"some type of inequitable conduct." Mobile Steel discussed
two further conditions relating to the application of the
doctrine: that the misconduct have "resulted in injury to the
creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on
the claimant," and that the subordination "not be inconsistent
with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act." This last
requirement has been read as a "reminder to the bankruptcy
court that although it is a court of equity, it is not free to
adjust the legally valid claim of an innocent party who asserts
the claim in good faith merely because the court perceives
that the result is inequitable."2 3
Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in relying upon the
equitable label to justify discretionary decisions or to legitimize a particular
determination. Sometimes equitable powers justify a deviation from accepted
procedure0 .or an order crafted for a particular situation.2°s Sometimes the
201. See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
474 U.S. 494 (1986).
While the Bankruptcy Court is a court of equity, the
Bankruptcy Code "does not authorize freewheeling
consideration of every conceivable equity." The
Bankruptcy Court may not, in the exercise of its
equitable powers, enforce its view of sound public
policy at the expense of the interests the Code is
designed to protect.
Id. at 514 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 527).
202. 517 U.S. 535 (1996).
203. Id. at 538-39 (citations omitted) (quoting Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B.
Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40
Bus. LAW. 417,428 (1985)).
204. See, e.g., In re Jarvis, 53 F.3d 416, 419 (Ist Cir. 1995); Themy v. Yu (In re
Themy), 6 F.3d 688, 689 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Richards (In re Richards), 994 F.2d
763,765 (10th Cir. 1993); Finneyv. Smith (In reFinney), 992 F.2d43,45 (4th Cir. 1993); Land
v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Land), 943 F.2d 1265, 1267 (10th Cir. 1991).
205. See, e.g., Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc. v. New Bedford Inst. for Say. (In
re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc.), 50 F.3d 72, 75 (lst Cir. 1995); Constant Ltd. Partnership
v. Jamesway Corp. (In re Jamesway Corp.), 179 BR. 33,37 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Dailey, 36
B.R. 147, 149-50 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983).
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phrase simply refers to a court's consideration of a number of factors,2 °6 the
totality of the circumstances,0 7 exercise of section 105 powers," 8 or is linked
to the conclusion that evidence presented satisfies an undefined standard such
as "cause." 209 Arguably, to the extent bankruptcy courts act within powers
granted to them by statute, no further justification is needed for a ruling.
However, too often the phrase "court of equity" is lubricating language used
to explain orjustify a deviation from the express provisions of the Code. In this
context, the reference often acts as poor cover.210
C. Court of Equity Is Synonymous With Relaxed Procedure and
Individualized Justice
Scholars observe that the appeal of equity jurisprudence in Anglo-
American history has increased during periods of great social change." For
example, some argue that access to the courts and the availability of remedies
to disenfranchised individuals and groups was expanded in order to cope with
social, political, and economic challenges after World War II. Social pressure,
such as the civil rights movement, prompted structural reform of institutions.
Congress expanded the rights of minorities, the poor, women, workers, prison
inmates, and the mentally and physically handicapped. Courts discovered new,
206. See, e.g., Kline v. Lewis (In re Kline), No. NM-98-009, 1998 WL 637276, at *4
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. Sept. 14, 1998).
207. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108, 1117 (3d Cir. 1995).
208. Arguably, thepowers set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to "issue any order, process
orjudgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title," are statutory
rather than equitable powers. Many circuits confine such powers to those consistent with and
necessary for the enforcement of Bankruptcy Code provisions. See, e.g., In re Fesco Plastics
Corp., 996 F.2d 152,157 (7th Cir. 1993); Landsing Diversified Properties-Il v. FirstNat'l Bank
& Trust Co. (In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 601 (10th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam).
209. See, e.g., Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little
Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1071-72 (5th Cir. 1986). It is interesting that both Article III
courts and state courts of general jurisdiction frequently apply the standard of "cause" or "good
cause" without any reference to equitable powers.
210. The mischief worked by the designation is evident in numerous appellate
decisions limiting bankruptcy court discretion to that specified by the Code. See Thinking
Machs. Corp. v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp. No. 1 (In re Thinking Machs. Corp.), 67 F.3d 1021,
1028 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Jarvis, 53 F.3d 416,419 (Ist Cir. 1995); Momentum Mfg. Corp. v.
Employee Creditors Comm. (In re Momentum Mfg. Corp.), 25 F.3d 1132, 1136 (2d Cir. 1994);
IRS v. Levy (In re Landbank Equity Corp.), 973 F.2d 265, 271 (4th Cir. 1992); In re Plaza de
Diego Shopping Ctr., Inc., 911 F.2d 820, 830-31 (lst Cir. 1990); Shoreline Concrete Co. v.
United States (In re Shoreline Concrete Co.), 831 F.2d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 1987); Chinichian v.
Campolongo (In re Chinichian), 784 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. First Nat'l
Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1983).
211. See, e.g., CHARLES W. BACON &FRANKLYN S. MORSE, THE REASONABLENESS OF
THE LAW: THE ADAPTABILITY OF LEGAL SANCTIONS TO THE NEEDS OF SOCIETY 187 (1924);
HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY & RONALD HARLING MAUDSLEY, MODERN EQuITY 13 (10th ed.
1976); see Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 28, at 277-78.
1999]
33
Krieger: "The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity": What Does That Mean?
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
legally cognizable harms and used equitable powers which filled gaps in
developing substantive laws.
In the area of mass torts, Judge Weinstein1 2 observes that in the last fifty
years concepts of equity have advanced the law to meet changing social needs.
American courts responded by radically departing from
the traditional models-at least insofar as they began to apply
older equitable forms of aggregation to new categories of
private litigants. New judicially-created laws were justified in
the name of redistributing risk and internalizing costs. Once
the province of common law courts and judges, mass tort
cases now forced the courts to adopt an equitable posture.
Courts of equity traditionally have taken into account the
equities-the concrete issues of fact and fairness of the
particular situation-in fashioning remedies. In the mass tort
context these include: (1) fairly and expeditiously
compensating numerous victims, and (2) deterring wrongful
conduct where possible; while (3) preventing over deterrence
in mass torts from shutting down industry or removing
needed products from the market, (4) keeping the courts from
becoming paralyzed by tens or even hundreds of thousands of
repetitive personal injury cases, and (5) reducing transactional
costs of compensation.
Were it not for the jury system, protected as it is by the
[S]eventh [A]mendment to the United States Constitution, the
procedural swing to equity would have been even greater. As
it is, the growth of deposition practice, summary judgment
and judgment notwithstanding the verdict has tended to
attenuate the traditional jury system, characterized as it is by
testimony in open court.
On the substantive side, judicially-created equitable-legal
doctrines enhanced the ability of toxic tort victims to recover
for their injuries in the absence of particularized proof of
causation and liability. The courts relaxed traditional concepts
of fault and causation and expanded the definition of
compensable injuries. These innovations, however, are
indebted more to a judicial state of mind than to any
substantive equitable antecedents. For, despite the fact that
equity in post-medieval England eventually became
212. Jack B. Weinstein is a judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York. Judge Weinstein also serves as an adjunct professor at the Columbia and
Brooklyn Law Schools. See Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 28, at 269 n.*.
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somewhat incapacitated by precedent, it never lost its aura of
gung ho problem solving with the concomitant pragmatic,
flexible, and activist view that was embodied in that
jurisprudential cast. Even when the chancellors were
immobilized by self-imposed restraints they worked in the
glow of such maxims as "Equity delights in doing equity."
This spiritual reserve remained available to permit judges
exercising equitable jurisdiction to create new forms and law
to prevent modem injustices.213
In this same period of time, Congress enacted extensive bankruptcy reform.
The Bankruptcy Code and accompanying- statutes converted bankruptcy
referees into judges, expanded bankruptcy jurisdiction, andprovided a broader
scope of discharge to more debtors. Although the Code removed bankruptcy
judges from certain administrative and supervisory functions previously
handled by bankruptcy referees, the expectation of informal procedure unlike
that found in state and federal district courts persists.214
The expansion in access to the courts, increased variety of remedies, and
flexibility in pleading under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has increased
civil case filings andreducedprocedural formality. But such benefits have been
accompanied by complaints about cost and delay, unwieldy cases, uncontrolled
discovery, unrestrained attorney latitude, and abuse ofjudicial discretion. Such
complaints, in turn, have given rise to reform efforts including use of
magistrates, alternative dispute resolution, and more numerous, as well as more
complex, rules of practice. In addition, bankruptcy courts have implemented
"scream or die" notice procedures, testimony by written declaration, and
limited discovery. Judicial management has become increasingly important to
assure progress of cases through the judicial system.
Characterizing the bankruptcy court as a court of equity is less appropriate
in the 1990s than ever before. Putting aside the absence of historical
justification for the moniker and the fact that bankruptcy courts apply a
statutory scheme rather than equitible maxims, they do not operate in the same
fashion as did courts of equity. Historically, courts of equity provided a
flexible, summary, and individualized process. But layers of rules, procedures,
and forms burden the bankruptcy process often making it more complex than
litigation in other courts. Local rules, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in some contexts, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, as well as the Bankruptcy Code apply in bankruptcy cases and
adversary proceedings. The combination of complex law and procedure
213. Id. at 273-75 (footnotes omitted).
214. A recent example of this view is the mistaken assumption ofone attorney: "The
judge is never going to rule on that evidentiary objection. Bankruptcy is a court of equity." How
Important Are the Rules of Evidence in Bankruptcy Court? BANKR. Cr. DECISIONS, Aug. 18,
1998 at Al. Unfortunately, the judge did rule on the objection.
1999]
35
Krieger: "The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity": What Does That Mean?
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
frequently creates obstacles for practitioners who do not routinely practice
bankruptcy law and for the increasing number of parties appearing without
counsel.
Repeated reference to the bankruptcy court as a court of equity creates an
inaccurate impression that the bankruptcy process is simple, summary, and
individualized. This, in turn, leads to confusion and disappointed expectations.
Social commentary is replete with examples of our modem risk-averse and
remedy-sensitive society. For uninsurable risks, society anticipates a legal or
equitable remedy. Not understanding the historical orjurisprudential meaning
of the phrase "court of equity," litigants use it to request a result which they
perceive as fair and just. In colloquial terms, one might call this "Burger King
justice" or "justice my way." In the author's experience, almost all arguments
which begin with the observation that the bankruptcy court is a court of equity
conclude either with a request for social policy change by judicial decree or for
a result different than that required by the Bankruptcy Code.
Despite a judge's desire to "do justice" in every controversy, the
bankruptcy court is not free to fashion relief to suit the emotional and economic
desires of every litigant. The court's powers are limited by the Bankruptcy
Code and the social policy that underlies it, a policy that necessarily benefits
some segments of society at the expense of others. Application of statutory law
often disappoints and frustrates parties who expect the result to be "fair" or
"equitable." One common example is the situation where a trustee seeks to
recover a pre-petition preferential payment from a creditor. Those who
understand the philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code realize that recovery of the
payment for the benefit of the estate results in a predictable pro rata distribution
of assets among similarly situated creditors. But in the creditor's eyes there is
nothing improper or illegal in obtaining payment of a debt which comes due.
Collection of a pre-petition debt not only makes good business sense, it is
consistent with non-bankruptcy law. To the creditor, return of the payment to
the trustee in order to receive a dividend of a fraction of the payment is neither
fair nor equitable. When litigants expect a subjectively fair result from the
"court of equity" and the bankruptcy court fails to deliver, it is not surprising
that some lose faith in the law and in the judicial system.
V. CONCLUSION
Describing the bankruptcy court as a court of equity is traditional and
convenient, but it is not accurate. This description obscures the true nature of
the court and the statutory scheme that it applies. From historical, procedural,
jurisprudential, and practical perspectives the bankruptcy court is not a court
of equity. It is, instead, a specialized court of limited jurisdiction applying
statutory law that embodies a particular, often changing, social objective.
At best the term "court of equity" lacks a generally accepted meaning. At
worst it is deceptive because it implies a simple, flexible process to determine
individual disputes according to equitable maxims. Whether imprecise or
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misleading, the phrase leads to confusion as to the court's jurisdiction and
discretion. More importantly, the label disappoints participants who expect, but
do not receive a "fair" result.
In considering bankruptcy reform, Congress has an opportunity to
enunciate clearly the social policy it adopts. But a greater challenge falls to the
judiciary and practicing bar to exercise precision in describing the role and
purpose of the bankruptcy court. When judges and attorneys recognize and
acknowledge that the bankruptcy court is a statutory court charged with
implementing social policy law, predictability in outcome will increase, and,
therefore, litigants' confidence in the bankruptcy process will increase as well.
Furthermore, our precision in describing the limitations of the bankruptcy court
redirects complaints about the social policy embedded in the Bankruptcy Code
to those who enacted it and therefore can change it. Ultimately, equity lies not
in the court, but in the Bankruptcy Code it applies.
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